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FINAL

EXAMINATION

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
FIRST

S E M EST E R 1969 - 1970

Question No.1:
Alabama. together with every other state, participates in the Federal
Government's aid to fatherless families with dependent children (AFDC)
program which was established by the Social Security Act of 1935. as amended.
The Social Security Act provides that participating states must grant applicants for AFDC payments who are denied aid "an opportunity for a fair
hearing before the State agency. ",

The Department of Pensions and

Security of Alabama had adopted regulations providing for administrative
review of such denials.
In June 1964 the Department of Pensions and Security of Alabama put into
effect a socalled "substitute father'! regulation which denied AFDC payment
to children of a mother who "cohabits" in or outside her home with any
single or married man.
As justification for the regulation the Dapartment of Pensions and Security
of Alabama asserted:
legitimate births.

(1) It discouraged illicit sexual relationships and il-

(2) In addition, puts families in which there is an illicit

extra marital relationship on the par with those in which there is a legal marital
relationship. because families of the latter class are not eligible for AFDC assistance.

The evidence showed that between June 19 64, when the regulation
became effective in January 19 6 7 the total number of AFDC recipients in
the state declined by about 20,000 persons, and the number of children
recipients by 16,000, or 22%.
Mrs. Sylvester Smith and her four children, ages 14, 12, 11 and 9
reside in Dallas County, Alabama.

For several years prior to October 1,

1966, they had received aid under the AFDC program.

By notice dated

October 11, 19 6 6 they were removed from the list of persons eligible to receive such aid.

This action is taken by the Dallas County Welfare authorities

pursuant to the "substitute father" regulation, on the ground that a M r. Williams regularly came to her home on week ends and had sexual relations
with her.

Mr. Williams, who was thus clas sified as a "substitute father"

of Mrs. Smith's children, had nine children of his own and lived with his
wife except on week ends.
Subsequent to the termination of AFDC payment s :M rs. Smith and her
four children lived on Mrs. Smith's salary of between $1 (;. and $20 per week
which she earned working from 3:30 a. m. to 12 noon as a cook and waitress.
Shortly after receiving the notice of termination of AFDC payments
Mrs. Smith bought a class action against the officers and members of the
Alabama Board of Pensions and Security in the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama, under 42 USC §l983, seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief.
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A three-judge District Court was convened to hear t he case.
In her complaint !vl rs. Smith alleged that the "substitute father" regulation violated the equal protection clause of the four t eenth amendment of
the Cons t itution of the United States and also violated the Social Security Act.
Should the Court adjudicate these substantive constitutional questions, and
for what reasons?

Question No.2:
A holding company which controlled both an integrated electric utility .
system was ordered by the Securities Exchange Commission to divest itself
of the gas utility system.

§ 11 (B)

(1) of the Public U t ility Holding .company

Act of 1935 provides that a holding company is to be limited in operation by
the Commission "to a single integrated public-utility system", unless the
Commission finds that an additional system cannot b e operated as an independent system "without the loss of substantial economies which can be
secured by retention of control by such holding company of such system. "
The holding company brought proceedings in the Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit under § 24 (A) of the Act for review of the Commission's divestment order, as s e rting the following gr ounds :

1.

The Commission's construction of the term "loss of substantial
economies" in the A ct was incorrect and in violation of the Act.

2.

That the Commission's order of divestment was not supported
by the evidence of record, and that the Commission's opinion
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did not reveal any application of both reason and experience to the
facts which would merit endorsement by the Court as a responsible
exercise of administrative expertise.
To what extent should the Court review the Commission's divestment
order and for what reasons?

Question No.3:
Banks in Texas applied to the Comptroller of the Currency for approval
of bank mergers in those states pursuant to the Bank Merger Act of 196 6 .
Although the Attorney General and the Federal Reserve System both submitted
adverse reports to the mergers, the Comptroller approved them.

The United

States filed Civil suits under § 7 of the Clayton Act in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas seeking to prevent the mergers.
The Comptroller intervened in the suit.
The Bank Merger Act of 1966 (12) USC § 1828 (C) provides that the Comptroller shall not approve a bank merger with anticompetitive effects unless he
finds that such effects are clearly outweighed in the public interest by the
probably effect of the transaction in meeting community convenience and need.
The Act also provides that the Court in an anti-trust action involving the bank
mergers "shall review de novo the issues presented."
The Comptroller's action in approving the merger was informal, no hearings having been held, and none being required by the Bank Merger Act.
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In these suits it was contended that under the proper construction of the
Bank Merger Act the banks had the burden of proof to establish that the merger
is within the statutory exception that the anticompetitive effects of the proposed
transaction are clearly outweighed in the public interest by the probable effect
of the transaction in meeting the convenience and needs of the community to be
served.

It was also contended that under the provision in the Bank Merger Act

that the Court "shall review de novo the issues presented" the Court should
make an independent determination of the factual issues involved in whether
the challenged bank merger should be approved under the standards set
forth in the Act and should not in any way be bound by or required to give any
special weight to the determination of the Comptroller.
What is the proper scope of review to be accorded by the Court in this
case and for what reasons?

'~uestion

No.4:

The Toilet Goods Association, Inc. an organization of cosmetics manufacturers accounting for some 90% of annual American sales in this field,
and 39 individual cosmetic manufacturers and distributors brought this suit
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.
They sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the Secretary of Health
Education and Welfare and the Commissioner

of Food and Drugs on the ground

that certain regulations promulgated by the Commissioner exceeded his
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statutory authority under the Color Additive Amendments to the Federal
Food and Drug Cosmetic Act (USC §§321-37 6 ).
The regulation in issue broadens the authority of the Commissioner to
control the ingredients added to foods, drugs and cosmetics that impart
color to them.
The Commissioner of Food and Drugs, exercising power delegated by
the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, under statutory authority
lito promulgate regulations for the efficient enforcement of the Act, issued the following regulation after due public notice (26 Reg. 6 79) and consideration of comments submitted by interested parties:
"(a) When it appears to the Commissioner that a person has:

(4) Refused to permit duly authorized employees of the Food
and Drug Administration free access to all manufacturing
facilities, proces ses, and formulae involved in the manufacture of color additives and intermediates from which
such color additives are derived; he may immediately suspend
certification service to such person and may continue such
suspension until adequate correctiT/ e action has been taken."
The certification service referred to was the certification by the
Commissioner of the color additives used by the cosmetic manufacturers.
Immediately after this regulation was issued and became effective the
plaintiff filed this suit.
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In this posture in the matter what is the proper scope of review, if
any t by the District Court, and for what reasons?

Question No.5:
In 1966 oral arguments in proceedings before the Federal Trade Commission for alleged violations of certain provisions of the Robinson-Patman
Act were heard by the full Commission of five members.

However , two

Commissioners retired before the decision and a new Commissioner, appointed to fill one of the vacancies, declined to participate in the decision
because he had not heard the oral argument.

A cease and desist order was

entered concurred in by only two of the participating Commissioners.
On petition for review of the Commission's cease and desist order
filed in the Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit it was conten<i'ed that the
order was invalid and unenforceable because it was concurred in by only two
of the total of five Commissioners.
The Federal Trade Commission Act does not specify the number of
Commissioners who may constitute a quorum.

By rule of the Commission

first adopted in 1915 it is provided:
"A majority of the members of the Commission constitute a
quorum for the transaction of business. "
How should the Court rule on the question of the validity and enforceability of the Commissio n 's order, and for what reasons?
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Question No.6:
The Selective Service Act (USC Appex § 456 (j) provides that in the
case of an adverse ruling by a local draft board on a registrants claim for
draft exemption as a conscientious objector, the registrant may appeal to an
Appeal Board.

The Act requires that on such an appeal the Department of

Justice, after appropriate inquiry, is required to hold a hearing and thereafter to make a recommendation to the Board as to the registrants inductibility.
The petitioner registered under the Selective Service Laws in 1948.

At

that time, he did not claim to be a minister or a conscientious objector, but
stated that he believed his classification should be lAo
classified him.

The local Board so

In 1951 he was given a dependency deferment which was termi-

nated on October 22, 1951, thereby restoring him to a IP. classification.

Within

a week after his restoration to IA classification petitioner filed a special
form for conscientious objectors claiming exemption from combat and noncombat service.

The petitioner stated that in December 1950 he had become an

unordained minister in the Jehoyah's Witnesses religious sect, and had become
an ordained minister in October 1951; that he preached from house to house and
on the streets, giving public expression to his conscientious objections to war.
The local Board continued him in a lA classification and petitioner filed
an appeal.

The Appeal Board referred the case to the Department of Justice

under the Act for appropriate inquiry and hearing and subsequent recommendato the Board.
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At the hearing the petitioner requested that he be advised as to the
general nature and character of any adverse evidence in the FBI report
on him.

According to petitioner's uncontradicted testimony. the hearing

officer told him that the FBI report disclosed that he had been hanging
around pool rooms and petitioner denied this.

Petitioner asked what else

was in the report and the hearing officer changed the subject.

At the hearing

the hearing officer asked petitioner's wife how she was feeling and how petitioner was treating her.

Her reply was, "fine".

The hearing officer recommended that petitioner be classified lA because
his religious activities coincided with pressure from the draft Board.

In

his report to the Appeal Board, the Department of Justice adopted hearing
officer's recommendation, relying on the timing of petitioner' 5 religious
activities and !lhis abusi:v:·e nesa ·and the exercise of physical violence toward
his wife" and because petitioner had been .I!a rather heavy drinker and crap
shooter in and around local taverns and pool halls. "
Petitioner refused to submit to induction and this prosecution followed.
On trial, petitioner claimed that he had not been afforded a fair hearing as
required by the Act becaus e of the failure of the Department of Justice to
furnish him with a fair resume of all adverse information in the FBI report
in the files of the Department, and that this invalidated his lA classification
and his conviction of refusing to subm.it to induction.
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The Supreme Court of the United States granted writ of certiorari to
review the judgment of the Court of Appeals of the 7th Circuit affirming
defendant's conviction in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois.
How should the Supreme Court of the United States rule and for what
reasons?

Question No.7:
Applications for construction permits for standard broadcast stations
were filed with the FCC, one by the Easton Publishing Company for Easton.
Pennsylvania and the other by Allentown Broadcasting Corporation for
Allentown, Pennsylvania.

Both were for the same frequency, and, despite

the fact that neither station would render service to the other community,
simultaneous operation of the two stations would cause mutually distructive
interference.
The hearing examiner who conducted the hearings on the two applications
recommended that the Allentown application be granted.

Easton filed ex-

ceptions to that initial decision of the hearing examiner with the Commission,
and after oral argument the Commission issued its final decision, disagreeing
with this examiner and granting the station to Easton.
The Commission made detailed findings of fact as to the qualifications
of the applicants and the nature of the communities to be served.
tors provided no basis for choosing between the applicants.
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Most fac-

Both were found

legally, technically, and otherwise qualified to become the licensee; both
communities were equally in need of programs p r opos ed to be broadcast by
each applicant.

One differentiating factor however wa s that Allentown

had three local stations whereas Easton only had one station.

The Com-

mission recognized that Allentown was a city of almost triple the size of
Easton and growing at a greater pace, but held that Easton's need for a
choice between locally orginated programs was decisive.
On judicial review of the Commission's award of the license the Allentown Broadcasting Company argued that the Commission's reversal o f its
hearing examiner was erroneous because the examiner's findings based on
demeanor of a witness are not to be overruled by the board without a "very
substantial preponderanc e in the testimony as recorded, " and that the Board
only had authority to reverse an examiner's findings only when they are

"clearly erroneous.

It

What disposition should the reviewing Court make of this contention of
Allentown Broadcasting Company, and for what reasons?

Question No.8:
An employer, charged with violations of the wage stabilization provisions
of the Defense Production Act of 1950 sought to enjoin administrative proceedings to determine his guilt of the violations charged, alleging that:
1.

The conduct of the proposed administrative hearings would
cause it irreparable damage by weakening its
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bank credit and

depriving it of es sential working capital.
2.

That the Act did not authorize such adminis'.

trative action for tre enforcement of the wage stabilization provisions.
The employer pointed out that the conduct of the proposed administrative
hearings would cause it irreparable damage by weakening its bank credit
and thereby depriving it of essential working capital regardless of the
outcome, because:

(1) If the National Enforcement Commission should

find a violation it would certify to all governmental agencies including the
Internal Revenue Service for income tax purposes, the disallowance of all
illegal wage payments found by it to have been made, which would disqualify
such payments as a busines s expense for income tax purposes.

The amount

of excess wage payments involved ranged from $750,000 to $5, 500,000.
(2) Its banks would be alerted to this possibility and would call their loans
and refuse additional working capital loans.
What disposition should the Court make of the case and for what reasons?

Question No.9:
The I drr..inistrative Procedure Act (5USC § 1001 etseq. ) applies to Post
Office Depar tment Administrative procedures.
The plaintiff operates a mail-order

business in Hollywood, California

under the fictitious name" Male Merchandise Mart", which was duly recorded
with the state authorities.

Her business is selling and distributing through
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the mails "publications, pin-up pictures and novelties. "
On March 1, 1954 the Solicitor for the Post Office Department issued a
complaint against her, charging that she was carrying; en by means of the
Post Office, a scheme for obtaining money for articles of an obscene character,
and further charged that she was depositing in the mails information as to
where such articles could be obtained, all in violation of 39 USC §§ 255 and
259 (a), 18 USC § § 1342 and 1461.;
On the same day on which the complaint is sued, the Deputy Postmaster
General ordered the Postmaster at Los Angeles, California, to refuse to
deliver mail addressed to petitioner at her business address.

The order

stated that a complaint of unlawful use of the mails had been filed, that a
hearing would be held to establish whether there were any violations of the
applicable statutes, and that the mail addressed to petitioner should be impounded until further order.

This order continued in effect, and was issued

without notice or hearing.
Petitioner answered the complaint and a hearing was held in Washington,

D. C. in early March 1954.
In the latter part of l'v1arch 1954, there having been no administrative
adjudication as a result of the hearing, the matter being under advisement
in the Post Office Department, the plaintiff filed an action for declaratory
relief in the District Court for the Southern District of California.
the
Plaintiff sought a decree enjoining/interim impound order pending final
administrative determination and pending judicial review of the validity of the

- 13 -

impound order.

The plaintiff d i d not ask the Court to interfere in any

way with the administrative proceeding which was being conducted.
In her complaint the plaintiff complained only of the interim impound order
under which her mail was being intercepted while the administrative proceeding was being conducted.

She complained that the interitn impound order

was entered without notice, without a hearing, and without any authority
in law, statutory or otherwise, and in violation of her constitutional rights
under the First, Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the United States Constitution, and that she was being irreparably injured thereby.
The statutes under which the Post Office Departm e nt was created and
under which it operated contained no specific authorization to the Post Office
Department to impound mail without a hearing and before there had been any
final determination of illegal activity.

A bill was pending in Congress which

would give such power to the Post Office Department with certain judicial
safeguards.

The Post Office Department argued that such power was neces-

sary for if an illicit busines s could continue while the administrative hearings were underway, those who operated on a fly-by-night basis would be
able to stay one jump ahead of the law.
What is the proper scope of judicial review for the Court to afford on
plaintiff's complaint, and for what reasons?
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Question No. 10:

Proceedings in which the Interstate Commerce Commission issued a
certificate of public convenience for water carrier service were later
reopened and the certificate amended to restrict operations thereunder
to freightage.

Subsequently the amended certificate was transferred,

with Commission approval.

The transferee accepted the modified cer-

tificate and operated thereunder for some years.

He then filed with the

Commission a petition for an interpretation of the amended certificate
claiming the right to engage in both towing and freighting operations.
He contended that such operations were permissab1e under the original
certificate issued to his transferor, and that the Commission's amendment of that ce . .-tificate restricting the operations thereunder to freightage
was unauthorized under the circumstances of the '· case.
The Commission issued an order interpreting the amended certificate
to permit freightage only.

Thereupon, the transferee filed a complaint

in the District Court to have the order set aside.
Should the District Court grant or refuse the relief sought and for what
reasons?
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